intellectual property

This paper discusses the problems related to assigning or denying intellectual property rights to biotechnological innovation, with particular reference to agro-biotechnologies and the relations between developed and developing countries.

This paper contributes to the debate upon the trade-off between science and technology by looking at how the scientific performances of a researcher relate ex-ante to his/her attitude to patent, during his/her academic career.

Focusing on patents and copyrights, the authors examines the rationale, objectives, operation and performance of alternative systems of intellectual property rights governance.

GAO recommends that USPTO develop formal strategies to improve communication and collaboration between management, patent examiners, and the union to help to address the issues identified in this report.

To better position USPTO to improve its patent process through the use of automation, GAO is making recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce that address the agency’s management of its patent automation strategy and related information technology investments.

The authors examine the individual, contextual, and institutional determinants of faculty patenting behavior in a panel dataset spanning the careers of 3,884 academic life scientists.

The authors examine whether the patent offices make consistent decisions for a given invention using a dataset of 70,000 patent applications that have been granted in the US and submitted in Japan and Europe and have a single, common priority application.

The authors show that, generally speaking, the socially optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases. They also provide simple empirical estimates of how much it should decrease.

This paper discusses two different models, the strong intellectual property rights model, and the open source, open science model, and their implications on the innovative activity of firms and economies, and the market dynamics.

The authors dentify a new route through which patent protection may affect R&D incentives, the tournament effect. It may decrease R\&D incentives, in which case patent protection may either adversely affect the level of R&D, or may discourage licensing. In either case welfare may fall.