intellectual property

The authors construct a dynamic model of university research that allows them to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of U.S. research universities.

The paper analyzes the strategic choice of certifiers in rival and non-rival situations of intellectual property in a three-stage game. The authors extend the basic model to multiple categories of users to the downstream presence of the sponsor, and to within-user-group network externalities and study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing standards.

According to the report from the Government Accountability Office, U.S. efforts have contributed to strengthened intellectual property legislation
overseas, but enforcement in many countries remains weak. U.S. industry has been supportive of U.S. actions, however, future U.S. efforts face significant challenges.

The report summarizes the opinion of a group of experts assembled by the European Commission on the management of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Directed primarily at research universities and research centers funded by publics funds, the report is designed to help them identify the processes, good practices and the implications of a more active involvement in the innovation process through the management of IPR and other policies and tools such as interaction with industry and the creation of new companies.

According to the authors, the economic literature on technical change has increasingly relied upon patent citation data to measure interpersonal knowledge flows. They propose to apply social network analysis to derive maps of social relationships between inventors, and measures of social proximity between cited and citing patents.

The authors model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowledge is unverifiable and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity important. They believe that their framework may help explain the structure and stability of multimember technology trading coalitions such as Sematech and Silicon Valley.

According to the author, recent surveys report that firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents in order to appropriate a return on their innovation. Yet, firms do patent, as indicated by the large
number of patents that are granted. The paper attempts to offer a possible resolution to the puzzle.

The author argues that it is necessary to safeguard the incentive and award rationales of intellectual property protection while at the same time controlling the risks of an undue extension of legal exclusivity.

The authors argue that intellectual property protection involves a tradeoff between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation.

The authors analyze the effects of information leakage on the incentives to innovate in firms. They also analyze a situation in which an employee in a firm is inspired with a new idea for a product.