Intellectual Property and the Scale of the Market
The authors argue that intellectual property protection involves a tradeoff between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation.
The authors argue that intellectual property protection involves a tradeoff between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation.
The authors analyze the effects of information leakage on the incentives to innovate in firms. They also analyze a situation in which an employee in a firm is inspired with a new idea for a product.
The paper develops an evolutionary model of
industry dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger patent system. The first results obtained in the paper are rather consistent with the anti-patent
arguments and they do not favour the case for a stronger patent system.
The paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It confirms that the increase is largely due to U.S. patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some increase in Europe.
Using a unique database on individual Swedish patents, a survival model estimates how different factors influence the time it takes until commercialization starts.
According to the report, the rise of the knowledge economy is evidenced by the growth in the knowledge-based industrial and service sectors, which are growing faster than GDP, and thus increasing their share in the overall economy. Despite the economic slowdown in recent years, the knowledge intensity of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development economies continues to increase and private sector investments in R&D continues to rise.
According to the author, the evidence on the number of patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors as well as that on research and development (R&D) spending in Taiwan suggests that the reforms stimulated additional inventive activity, especially in industries where patent protection is generally regarded as an effective strategy for extracting returns, and in industries which are more R&D intensive.
The author studies strategic information transmission when biases are uncertain and demonstrates that it never benefits the decision maker or the expert to have the bias of the expert disclosed.
The authors find that increased appropriability, as measured by Lerners index of patent scope and effectiveness of patents in a line of business, decrease the hazard of termination and increase the hazard of first sale.
The authors find that increased appropriability, as measured by Lerners index of patent scope and effectiveness of patents in a line of business, decrease the hazard of termination and increase the hazard of first sale.